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Memory can be thought of as the capacity of an organism to utilise 
past experience in order to direct future behaviour.  Such a capacity 
entails the registering and recording – the encoding - of that 
experience in such a way as to enable its subsequent retrieval. 
Retrieval can be either voluntary or involuntary and the resultant 
information may or may not form part of conscious awareness.  The 
processes of encoding and retrieval are the result of a range of 
psychological processes and are in turn influenced by other factors 
both psychological and physiological.  In this respect, study of the 
patterning of memory processes and the factors that influence their 
operation can give clues to the wider psychological functioning of the 
individual.  It is in this last respect that the study of memory can 
enhance our understanding of people with autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD). ASD is not ‘caused by’ difficulties in memory, but the 
patterning of memory seen in individuals with ASD can provide clues to 
underlying cognitive and neuropsychological atypicalities as well as 
giving us a window onto their inner experiences of the world. 
 
1.0 Preliminary Remarks 
Any discussion of memory in ASD must first emphasise the 
heterogeneous nature of the conditions that comprise the autism 
spectrum.  An important aspect of this diversity is the distinction 
between ASD with accompanying intellectual disability (often referred 
to as ‘low-functioning ASD’ or LFA) and ASD without it (often termed 
‘high-functioning ASD’ or HFA).  Intellectual disability in itself has 
consequences for memory (see Bray, Fletcher & Turner, 1997; Wyatt 
& Conners, 1998 for reviews), but we should be careful about 
assuming that these consequences operate similarly in individuals with 
co-occurring ASD.  Nor should we assume that atypical memory 
patterns identified in individuals with HFA necessarily hold for those 
from the lower functioning parts of the spectrum.  Similar arguments 
hold for the distinction between individuals who have good language 
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and communication skills and those whose language capabilities are 
diminished or absent.  At present, systematic investigations into how 
these dimensions affect memory in the context of ASD are thin on the 
ground, so readers need to be aware of potential difficulties of 
interpretation when drawing conclusions from research that has been 
limited to particular subgroups of people within the ASD population. 
The same caveat applies to the topic of memory.  Although at first it 
appears to be a straightforward process – the recollection of 
something that happened in the past – a moment’s reflection throws 
up quite considerable complexity.  ‘Memory’ is always of something 
and is assessed using particular procedures, often with a particular aim 
or purpose in mind. The writing of this chapter entails the recollection 
of words (verbal memory) and concepts (semantic memory) that have 
to be organised in a way that takes into account (however imperfectly) 
the minds of potential readers.  Some of the information comes into 
the author’s mind through a deliberate act of recollection (albeit 
prompted by the various cues that nudge authors to complete 
manuscripts on time) whilst other ideas are engendered by the reading 
of source texts.  And all of these ideas are sorted and edited, accepted 
or rejected in the light of the overall aim of the exercise. Even this 
anecdotal scenario highlights the complexities that begin to emerge 
when considering where to draw boundaries for the concept of 
‘memory’.  We need to be clear about the kinds of material that are 
being remembered, whether the memory involves unsupported 
recollection, prompted recollection, or simply recognition that we had 
encountered something previously.  We also need to decide whether 
the remembered material was learned very recently or some time 
(maybe even years) ago. The topics of recollection, prompting or 
recognition have engendered some of the principal test measures used 
in laboratory and clinical studies of memory.  Recollection is usually 
tested by free recall, in which participants study lists of words and 
then recall as many as they can in any order. The prompt here is 
minimal, usually involving a request from the experimenter to recall the 
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words just studied.  Cued recall provides more concrete and specific 
hints to aid recall. These hints may be phonological (e.g., words that 
rhyme with…; words that begin with…) or semantic (e.g., there were 
flowers, items of furniture etc.) in nature.  Recognition involves 
studying long lists of items and then presenting these again, 
interspersed with non-studied items, asking the participant to indicate 
whether or not they had seen the item at study.  Recognition may also 
be tested by presenting participants with a studied and a new word 
and asking them to indicate which they had seen before. 
In parallel with material and procedural issues is the question of how 
we conceptualise what is going on in the brain and the mind during the 
operation of memory. New information must be encoded, which implies 
some kind of storage system, or a system that marks already-stored 
information in a way that links it to the study episode. Subsequent 
retrieval implies its own system or set of processes (for a fuller 
exposition of these topics, see Gardiner, 2008).  Some theorists argue 
that memory can be divided into two distinct sets of processes, those 
that operate over the very short term (e.g., working memory, 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), and which are distinct from the processes 
that subtend long-term memory.  Others, e.g. Bjork and Whiten 
(1974) and Crowder (1976) argue for an undivided memory system 
that may have particular characteristics when retrieval happens very 
soon after encoding.  Advocates of both positions generally argue that 
memory (or long-term memory, in the case of advocates of multi-store 
models) can be divided into procedural and declarative memory 
systems, and that the latter can be further subdivided.  For reasons of 
space, our discussion here will be limited to declarative memory in 
ASD. More detail on short-term and working memory in ASD can be 
found in Poirier and Martin (2008) and on procedural and implicit 
memory in Bowler, Matthews and Gardiner (1997), Gardiner, Bowler 
and Grice (2003), Mostofsky, Goldberg, Landa & Denckla (2000), 
Roediger and McDermott (1993) and Schacter and Tulving (1994). 
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Declarative memory is memory that is generally accessible to 
conscious awareness (Eichenbaum, 1999), different kinds of which are 
used by many theorists to delineate separate memory sub-systems 
and processes.  Tulving (2001) posits several systems, each 
associated with a characteristic type of conscious awareness.  The first 
of these systems is the semantic memory system, which is one’s store 
of general knowledge or what Tulving calls ‘timeless facts’, the recall of 
which is accompanied by noetic conscious awareness. The second is 
the episodic memory system, which comprises recollection of 
personally-experienced events and involves the self engaging in mental 
time travel to re-experience the spatio-temporal context of the 
recollected episode.  It is this experience of the self re-experiencing 
the past that he terms autonoetic conscious awareness and regards as 
being the hallmark of episodic memory.  To a similar end, Jacoby  
(1991) contrasts familiarity, a non-effortful process and recollection, 
which involves active, conscious control by the participant.  On this 
view, the quality of the conscious recollective experience depends on 
the relative contributions of familiarity and recollection to a particular 
memory. Cutting across these different systems and processes are 
considerations of the depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) 
implied by different kinds of material and brought about by different 
memory tasks.  For example, focussing on phonological aspects of 
words is thought of as entailing shallower levels of processing than 
does working out meaningful relations among them.  All these different 
theoretical positions are tested experimentally using manipulations of 
the procedures outlined earlier.  It is important to bear in mind that the 
results of a given experiment can often be interpreted in the light of 
different theoretical perspectives. 
 
2.0 Empirical Findings 
 2.1 Standard experimental procedures. 
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Amongst the earliest studies of memory in ASD were ones concerned 
with memory span, a classic measure of short-term memory, which is 
determined by the number of items that a participant can correctly 
recall in the order in which they were presented. Initial reports showed 
that individuals with ASD exhibited relatively undiminished performance 
on such tasks by comparison with mental-age matched participants 
without ASD (Boucher, 1978; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967).  However, 
as Poirier and Martin (2008) observe, these early studies are 
compromised by the fact that groups were often matched on 
psychometric measures of digit span, which equates groups on their 
ability to recall the order of a series of numbers. When matching was 
based on non-span measures and when more demanding measures of 
span were utilised, Martin, Poirier, Bowler et al. (2006) found 
marginally diminished span in adults with HFA.  More specifically, even 
though the absolute numbers of items recalled was undiminished, there 
was a significantly higher number of order errors in the recall of the 
HFA participants. These findings show that although the maximum 
number of items that individuals with ASD can recall is not different 
from that recalled by typical individuals, they have difficulties in 
recalling the precise order of the items, at least after a single 
exposure. 
Free recall of longer lists of words – supra-span lists – without the 
requirement to preserve the order of the studied words has a number 
of characteristic features in typical individuals.  The first few and the 
last few items in a list are more likely to be recalled than the middle 
items, yielding the classic serial position curve in free recall (Murdock, 
1962). Recall of the last few items – the recency effect – is thought, 
by advocates of multi-store theories, to reflect the contents of a 
short-term store, whereas recall of the first few items – the primacy 
effect – is thought to result from processing of information into long-
term memory.  Another characteristic of supra-span list recall is that 
typical individuals tend to cluster (i.e. recall in sequence) items that 
are drawn from the same semantic category (Bousfield, 1953), and 
 7 
this clustering usually yields higher overall recall than for uncategorised 
lists.  If the same list is presented repeatedly over several trials, then 
recall on each trial increases (free recall learning), and if the list is 
uncategorised, then participants will typically impose their own 
subjective organisation on the material, irrespective of the organisation 
of the studied list (Tulving, 1962). Assessments of phenomena such 
as these in ASD have yielded a characteristic pattern of observations. 
Free recall of uncategorised material in individuals with ASD is usually 
undiminished (Bowler et al., 1997; Minshew & Goldstein, 1993; 2001; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1991) unless there is concomitant intellectual 
disability (see Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Boucher & Lewis, 1989). 
In terms of the classic serial position effect, individuals with LFA tend 
to show diminished primacy and enhanced recency effects (Boucher, 
1979; 1981; O’Connor & Hermelin, 1967; Renner, Klinger & Klinger, 
2000) whereas HFA individuals generally show typical serial position 
effects (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & Saavalainen, 2000b; Toichi & Kamio, 
2002). The latter finding, however, needs to be interpreted with some 
caution since a recent study by Bowler, Limoges and Mottron (under 
review) showed that the primacy effect of HFA participants shows a 
slower improvement over successive trials than that of typical 
individuals. This raises the possibility that the primacy effect observed 
on a single trial, although superficially similar between typical and HFA 
participants, may be mediated by qualitatively different processes.  
The idea that memory operates in a qualitatively different manner in 
ASD and typical individuals is also evident in other memory 
phenomena. For instance, on later trials of multi-trial list learning, 
adults with HFA show slower rates of learning (Bennetto, Pennington & 
Rogers, 1996; Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008a). Diminished learning is 
often a sign that participants fail to subjectively organise material for 
effective recall but surprisingly, individuals with ASD engage in such 
organisation to a similar extent as do typical participants (Bowler et al., 
2008a). Individuals with ASD do, however, seem to engage in 
qualitatively different forms of subjective organisation. More 
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specifically, whilst typical participants tend to converge in the way in 
which they organise a repeatedly presented list of words during their 
recall attempts, participants with ASD do not, indicating that their 
subjective organisation follows a rather idiosyncratic pattern. 
Differences in how memory operates in typical and ASD individuals are 
even more obvious when the to-be-remembered material is 
semantically interrelated. Typical individuals consistently exhibit a 
memory advantage for more meaningful information but in ASD this 
phenomenon seems to depend on the nature of the task. Failure to use 
semantic aspects of study lists to aid free recall has long been known 
to be a feature of memory in LFA and HFA (Bowler et al., 2000b; 
Bowler et al., 1997; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970; Tager-Flusberg, 
1991; but see Leekam & Lopez, 2003).  Moreover, individuals from all 
parts of the autism spectrum are less likely to cluster semantically 
related items together in recall (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967; Bowler, 
Gaigg & Gardiner, under review b). When category-cued recall or 
recognition procedures are employed, however, individuals with ASD 
often exhibit a relatively typical memory advantage for semantically 
interrelated materials (Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Bowler, Gaigg & 
Gardiner, 2008b; Mottron, Morasse & Belleville, 2001, Tager-Flusberg, 
1991; Toichi & Kamio, 2002). These, more supported test procedures 
generally seem to prove less difficult for individuals with ASD (e.g., 
Bennetto et al., 1996; Bowler et al., 1997; Gardiner et al., 2003; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1991), suggesting that whatever processes are 
involved in free recall situations pose a particular difficulty for them. 
Individuals with ASD are, however, susceptible to associatively-induced 
illusions using the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) regardless of whether recognition or free recall 
procedures are employed. During the DRM paradigm, participants study 
a series of strong semantic associates of a non-studied word (e.g., 
bed, snooze, blanket, pillow, night… all of which are strong associates 
of sleep), which often leads them to falsely recall or recognise the non-
studied associate during a test phase. Two out of three studies 
(Bowler et al., 2000b; Hillier, Campbell, Kiellor et al., 2007) found that 
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adults with HFA were as likely as typical participants to falsely 
recognise the non-studied associate and in the Bowler et al. (2000b) 
study the authors also failed to find significant group differences in a 
free recall test. The third study (Beversdorf, Smith, Crucian et al., 
2000), using a slightly different method from the standard DRM 
paradigm reported increased discrimination of non-studied items in 
adults with ASD as did Hillier et al. (2007) when pictorial stimuli were 
used. 
The final source of evidence, which suggests that memory operates 
differently in ASD, stems from a series of recent studies that have 
investigated whether individuals with ASD, like typical participants, 
remember emotionally significant information better than emotionally 
neutral information (see Reisberg & Hertel, 2004; Uttl, Ohta & 
Siegenthaler, 2006 for a collection of reviews). The first study to 
investigate this phenomenon in ASD (Beversdorf, Anderson, Manning 
et al., 1998) asked adults with and without ASD to try to remember a 
series of emotionally charged and neutral statements (e.g., ‘He talks 
about death’ vs. ‘He is talking with his roommate’) for a subsequent 
free recall test. The results showed that only the typical comparison 
group recalled the emotionally charged statements significantly better 
than the neutral ones despite the fact that groups did not differ in 
terms of their recall of sentences and paragraphs that varied in terms 
of their syntactic and conceptual coherence. Recent studies have 
extended this finding. In one of these, Gaigg & Bowler (2008) 
presented participants with a list of words containing emotionally 
charged and neutral words and asked them to rate how emotionally 
intense they felt about them. During study, skin conductance 
responses, which index to the extent to which participants are 
physiologically stimulated by the study material, were also measured. 
After participants had seen all the words, their free recall was tested 
at three points in time – immediately after they had seen the words, 
again after an hour and once more after at least one day. The findings 
showed that whilst groups did not differ in terms of their ratings of the 
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words, their skin conductance responses to the words or their free 
recall performance on the immediate test, forgetting rates of 
emotional words over time were different in the ASD group. In a 
second experiment, Gaigg & Bowler (under review) employed a variant 
of the DRM illusion task developed by Pesta, Murphy and Sanders 
(2001) in order to determine to the extent to which it would be 
possible to induce false memories of emotionally charged words in 
individuals with ASD. Unlike typical participants who were far less likely 
to falsely recognise emotionally charged as compared to neutral words, 
those with ASD falsely recognised emotional and neutral words at 
roughly the same frequency. Only one study, to date, has failed to 
demonstrate differences between ASD and typical participants in their 
memories for emotionally charged words and interestingly this study 
employed a simple recognition test procedure (South, Ozonoff, Suchy 
et al., 2008), which generally pose few difficulties for individuals with 
ASD (Barth, Fein & Waterhouse, 1995; Bennetto et al, 1996; Bowler et 
al, 2000a,b; Bowler, Gardiner & Gaigg, 2007; Minshew, Johnson & 
Luna, 2001, but see Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004)1.  
The findings outlined above show that the memory difficulties 
experienced by individuals with ASD are relatively subtle, and are 
present on tasks where minimal clues are given for recall and where 
information has to be manipulated or processed in some way.  Before 
the broader implications of these observations are discussed, we need 
to present a further, and rather paradoxical set of findings centred on 
the fact that relatively spared recognition memory in ASD hides a 
subtle but persistent difficulty in episodic memory. 
2.2 Episodic Memory 
                                     
1 Individuals with LFA sometimes do exhibit difficulties on tests of 
recognition (Ameli, Courchesne & Lincoln, 1988; Barth et al, 1995; 
Summers & Craik, 1994) although this seems to depend on the precise 
nature of the recognition procedure used. What is needed to settle 
this question is a systematic evaluation of the effects of procedural 
and participant characteristics on recognition memory. 
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Despite recognition being an aspect of memory that poses few 
difficulties, at least for individuals with HFA, recent research has shown 
that this spared capacity conceals an important difficulty with episodic 
memory. One of the hallmarks of human memory is the ability to re-
experience oneself at the heart of the spatio-temporal context of a 
previously experienced episode.  The ability to do this involves an 
awareness of self that is continuous through past, present and future, 
as well as an ability to recollect not only that a particular event took 
place but also the context in which it happened. Some of the research 
on memory in ASD discussed above is consistent with a prediction that 
individuals on the autism spectrum might have atypicalities of episodic 
memory.  Their relatively greater difficulties on recall-based compared 
to recognition-based tasks points to episodic difficulties. In addition, 
their diminished recall of incidentally-encoded context (Bennetto et al, 
1996; Bowler et al, 2004, Bowler et al., 2008b) – sometimes referred 
to as source memory - constitutes another strand of evidence and the 
presence of frontal lobe-related executive function difficulties in ASD 
(see Hill, 2004a,b) together with the finding of episodic memory 
difficulties in frontal lobe patients (Wheeler & Stuss, 2003) is a third.  
More indirect support comes from a theoretical perspective of Perner 
and colleagues (see Perner, 2001), who argue that the cardinal 
characteristic of episodic memory – the re-experiencing of the self at 
the heart of a personally-experienced episode - depends on the ability 
to represent oneself as an experiencer of events, and to evoke that 
representation in memory.  This metarepresentational ability2 develops 
during the child’s fourth and fifth years and according to Perner, also 
underlies the ability to understand the behavioural consequences of 
false belief in others.  Difficulties with false belief understanding are 
seen in at least some manifestations of ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1985, but see Bowler, 2007, Chapters 2 & 3), and on Perner’s 
                                     
2 What is described here is Perner’s conception of the term 
‘metarepresentation’ (see Perner, 1991), which differs radically from 
that used by Leslie (e.g. Leslie, 1987), and which is also used in the 
context of ‘theory of mind’ in ASD. 
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arguments they should, as a consequence, experience diminished 
episodic remembering. 
A widely-used test of episodic memory is the ‘Remember/Know’ (R/K) 
procedure developed by Tulving (1985). Participants are asked to 
study a supra-span list of words for a later memory test.  At test, they 
are presented with single words, half of which comprise the earlier-
studied items, and are asked whether or not they had seen the word at 
study.  If they answer ‘yes’, they are then asked to make either a 
‘remember’ (R) judgment, where they can clearly recollect the episode 
of having studied the word, or a ‘know’ (K) judgment, where they 
simply know that they studied the item without any recollection of 
details of the study episode.  Bowler, Gardiner & Grice (2000a) utilised 
this procedure with adults with ASD and normal intelligence and found 
that the ASD group showed diminished R but not K responses by 
comparison with typical individuals matched on age and verbal IQ.  In 
order to assess whether the R responses that the ASD participants did 
produce were the result of similar underlying processing to that of the 
comparison group, Bowler et al. (2000a) included in the study list 
words that are encountered in English either frequently or infrequently.  
Low-frequency words typically yield more R responses in the R/K 
paradigm, and a similar pattern in the ASD group would suggest that 
although diminished in quantity, their R responses would be similar in 
quality to those of typical individuals.  This is what Bowler et al. found, 
and in a further series of studies that manipulated other factors known 
to affect levels of R and K responses in typical individuals, Bowler et al. 
(2007) found that adults with ASD and normal IQ responded to these 
manipulations in a similar manner to matched typical comparison 
participants. Dividing attention at study diminished R but left K 
responding unaffected, emphasising a perceptual set at study by 
asking participants to look out for blurred letters increased K 
responses but left R responses unaffected, and increasing number of 
study episodes increased R but not K responses. 
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The picture that emerges from the studies of Bowler et al. (2000a, 
2007) is that individuals with ASD show quantitatively diminished but 
qualitatively similar experiences of episodic recollection.  What remains 
to be established is whether this is the result of problems in re-
constructing the spatio-temporal aspects of the recollected episode or 
in imagining the self at the heart of such recollection or of difficulties 
in both these factors.  We will now discuss the research relating to 
both these possibilities as well as on the related issue of the ordering 
of elements of experience in time. 
 
 2.3 Re-creating the spatio-temporal context of an episode 
Individual episodes are characterised by the co-occurrence of elements 
of experience (e.g., meeting a particular friend at a particular time of 
day in a particular place etc.) that may form part of other, distinct 
episodes.  What defines an individual episode is the combination of 
attributes that are unique to it.  For an episode to be successfully 
retrieved, its elements need to be marked in such a way as to enable 
their subsequent retrieval as a bound unit.  Bowler, Gaigg and Gardiner 
(under review, a) showed that this relational binding capacity is 
diminished in individuals with ASD. They replicated a study of Chalfonte 
and Johnson (1996) who asked older and younger typical adults  to 
study sets of objects located in the cells of a grid.  The objects were 
presented in non-canonical colours (e.g. a blue banana or a pink leaf).  
Participants’ recognition of individual features (location, item, colour) 
and combinations of these features (item + location, item + colour) 
were then tested. Whereas older participants showed undiminished 
recognition of features, they were significantly poorer on recognition 
of combinations. Bowler et al. (under review, a) found similar intact 
feature and diminished combination recognition in a group of HFA 
adults, demonstrating that they too had difficulties in recognising 
episodically-defined bindings of elements of experience.  This finding 
was all the more surprising in that it demonstrated a binding difficulty 
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on a memory task – recognition – that does not usually pose problems 
for individuals with ASD. 
It can be argued that an intact ability to re-construct the combinations 
of features unique to an episode and the development of an accurate 
sense of the temporal order of events are intimately and necessarily 
related.  It follows from this that difficulties with the relational binding 
needed to recollect an episode should be accompanied by difficulties in 
temporal aspects of memory.  There are several strands of evidence 
from the ASD literature that support the conjecture that this is the 
case in ASD.  Bennetto et al. (1996) demonstrated diminished 
performance on an adaptation of the Corsi task in adolescents with 
ASD.  This task presents participants with sequences of concrete 
words or line drawings.  From time to time, a yellow card accompanied 
by a pair of previously-presented items is presented and participants 
have to decide which of the two items had been presented more 
recently.  Diminished performance was also reported in a serial order 
recall task in which Martin et al., (2006) asked adults with ASD to 
recall lists of digits that are close to their memory span. Although the 
number of items correctly recalled was similar to that of comparison 
participants, the ASD group made more order errors in recall, 
suggesting that they have difficulty recalling which items preceded and 
succeeded each recalled item.  Theorists such as Brown, Neath & 
Chater (2007) argue that sensitivity to such micro-contextual detail 
underlies successful serial recall, and its diminution in ASD further 
reinforces the idea that this population experiences particular difficulty 
in the accurate recall of the context of remembered material. The 
occurrence of the phenomenon in serial recall further supports the idea 
that accurate recall of context is needed for accurate temporal 
memory.  
Individuals with ASD have also been shown to have difficulties in 
reconstructing the order of occurrence of a set of items. Gaigg, Bowler 
& Gardiner (submitted) asked adults with ASD and matched typical 
comparison participants to re-order alphabetically-presented lists of 
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seven historical figures either into their actual chronological order or 
into a pseudo-random order that had been studied just beforehand.  
Whereas performance on the first task was comparable between the 
two groups, the ASD participants were significantly worse on the 
second task, indicating that they had particular difficulty in encoding 
an episodically determined ordering of the studied material. Difficulty in 
temporally ordering recall of material is also reflected in poor 
performance on narrative tasks. Reported difficulties include poor 
narrative organisation (Losh & Capps, 2003), diminished story recall 
(Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006) and reduced use of temporal 
referential devices in narrative (Colle, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & van 
der Lely, 2008). In a series of tests of diachronic thinking (the ability 
to reason about the unfolding of events over time), Boucher, Pons, 
Lind and Williams (2007) found poorer performance in children with 
ASD compared to matched typical children. 
All these findings reinforce the long-held view (see O’Connor & 
Hermelin, 1978; Boucher, 2001) that individuals with ASD experience 
difficulties with remembering the temporal ordering of experience.  The 
argument is made here that this difficulty is a consequence of 
difficulties with the binding together of elements of experience in 
episodic memory and which may have repercussions for the 
development of self-awareness.  In a later section, we outline how such 
binding difficulties might have wider application to difficulties with 
semantic organisation as well as to episodic memory.  First, we need to 
consider the other key aspect of episodic memory: the role of self 
awareness. 
  
2.4 The Self and Memory in ASD. 
 Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997, p.334) suggest that, “only 
through the sophisticated representation of self can an individual 
autonoetically recollect personal events from the past.”  If this 
approach is correct then self-awareness is an essential component of 
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episodic memory.  Studies of mirror self-recognition (e.g., Ferrari & 
Matthews, 1983), delayed video self-recognition (Lind & Bowler, under 
review, a) and action-monitoring (e.g., Williams & Happé, in press) 
suggest that individuals with ASD have intact awareness of their bodily 
selves and physical agency.  However, individuals with ASD appear to 
have diminished introspective awareness of their own mental (e.g., 
Philips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998) and emotional states (Ben 
Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett et al., 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Hill, 
Berthoz, & Frith, 2004).  Such a diminution of self-awareness may 
contribute to the episodic memory difficulties experienced by 
individuals with ASD.   
Some researchers have suggested that ASD may entail specific 
difficulties in personal or autobiographical episodic memory (Powell & 
Jordan, 1993; Crane & Goddard, 2008).  Consistent with this position, 
studies of autobiographical memory have indicated that whilst 
semantic autobiographical knowledge (e.g., knowledge of one’s date of 
birth) is intact amongst adults with ASD, episodic autobiographical 
memory (e.g., memory for one’s first day at secondary school) is 
diminished (Crane & Goddard, 2008; Goddard et al., 2006; Klein, Chan, 
& Loftus, 1999).  Moreover, evidence from a study by Lee and Hobson 
(1998) suggests that the verbal accounts of autobiographical events 
of people with ASD, in general, cannot be assumed to reflect episodic 
autonoetic remembering.  As part of a study of self-understanding, Lee 
and Hobson asked children, “Do you change from year to year?”  In 
response to this question and subsequent probes, they found that 
75% of participants with ASD, but no comparison participant, 
recounted events from babyhood.  The quality of these verbal 
accounts did not differ from the quality of their other reported 
memories.  The observation for the comparison participants is entirely 
in line with the position of ‘infantile amnesia’ advocated by most 
theories on typical memory development in children (see Bauer, 2006 
for review).  However, the observation for the ASD participants is not 
– in typical development, memories of events occurring prior to the 
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age of approximately 3 to 4 years are very rarely retained in later 
childhood or adulthood.  It is the fact that these “recollections” of 
babyhood did not qualitatively differ from their other “recollections” 
that may lead us to question whether any of their verbally described 
autobiographical memories were episodic in nature.   These data 
appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that autobiographical 
episodic memory is diminished in ASD.       
It has also been suggested that there may be ASD-specific 
impairments in memory for experiences directly involving the self 
(Hare, Mellor, & Azmi, 2007).  Typically developing individuals from 6 
years of age upwards demonstrate superior memory for self-performed 
tasks than other-person-performed tasks (e.g., Engelkamp, 1998; 
Roberts & Blades, 1998).  This memory advantage, which is associated 
with being a participating agent as opposed to an observer, is known 
as the enactment effect.  One account of the enactment effect is that 
memories of self-performed actions are more salient because they 
involve an additional motoric component.  The effect, therefore, 
depends on the capacity for action-monitoring, which involves 
distinguishing between internally and externally caused changes in 
perceptual experience.   
If ASD entails impairments in memory for experiences directly involving 
the self (Hare et al., 2007), one might predict that individuals with 
ASD should show a reduced or absent enactment effect.  Indeed, some 
studies have either failed to show a significant enactment effect 
amongst participants with ASD (Farrant, Blades & Boucher, 1998; Hare 
et al., 2007), or have found an “observer effect”, where participants 
with ASD demonstrated significantly better memory for another 
person’s actions than for their own (Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 
2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999).  However, two more recent studies 
have indicated that children with ASD show the enactment effect to 
the same extent as comparison children (Lind & Bowler, under review; 
Williams & Happé, in press).   
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Lind and Bowler’s (under review) study of memory for self and other in 
ASD included more than double the number of participants (n = 53) 
used in any previous study (maximum n employed = 22).  Their results 
may, therefore, be considered more representative.  They devised a 
task which assessed recognition and self-other source memory.  It was 
found that children with ASD showed significantly diminished source 
memory but undiminished recognition memory, relative to age- and 
ability-equated comparison children.  Both children with ASD and 
comparison children showed an enactment effect, demonstrating 
significantly better recognition (large effect size) and source memory 
(medium effect size) for self-performed actions than other-person-
performed actions.  Despite past speculations that ASD might involve 
action-monitoring difficulties (e.g., Russell, 1996), subsequent 
research has demonstrated that this is unlikely to be the case (e.g., 
Williams & Happé, in press).  Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
children with ASD should show the enactment effect to the same 
extent as children without ASD. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that individuals with ASD 
experience difficulties with episodic memory per se - their difficulties 
are not isolated to personal or autobiographical episodic memory. 
However, this conclusion does not undermine the hypothesis that 
diminished self-awareness may contribute to episodic memory 
difficulties in ASD.  It is likely that the ability to introspect on one’s 
own mental states and to represent oneself as an entity that is 
extended in time is intimately related to episodic memory in general.  
Mentally re-experiencing any event – whether it is central to one’s 
autobiographical history or otherwise – is likely to depend on such a 
sophisticated level of self-awareness. It is also possible that a 
sophisticated level of self-awareness depends on the ability to re-
construct a sequence of episodes, the ordering of which depends on 
the accurate binding of episode-relevant clusters of elements of 
experience. 
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3.0 Wider Conceptual Themes. 
The findings reviewed so far show relatively subtle memory difficulties 
that tend to centre on manipulation of information in memory rather 
than the memory for the information itself.  These difficulties tend to 
have greater repercussions on measures that provide less support at 
test (e.g. free recall) than those that do not (e.g. recognition). From 
the perspective of dual-store or working memory models, the findings 
both of span studies and on serial position effects show that 
difficulties seem to lie less with any of the memory storage systems 
and more with the central executive of the working memory system 
(Baddeley 1986). Research also shows that there is particular difficulty 
in manipulating material in ways that enable the detail of past episodes 
to be re-constructed and that this interacts in some way with the 
‘mental time travel’ that is needed for the operation of episodic 
recollection. And finally, the way in which memory is modulated by 
emotional factors operates atypically in ASD. In the following two 
sections, we will tease out some implications of these patterns of 
memory performance in an attempt to elucidate underlying processes 
that give rise to them.  In a final section, we attempt to reconcile the 
empirical findings and theoretical speculations with a brain-based 
account. 
 
3.1 Task Support 
The research reviewed so far paints a picture of difficulties in recalling 
material, especially when recall entails some effort, such as elucidating 
and manipulating semantic aspects of the material or when recall has 
to be enhanced over repeated trials. By contrast, fewer difficulties are 
seen on tasks that provide more explicit support for retrieval, such as 
cued recall or recognition.  This particular pattern was first noted by 
Boucher (Boucher, 1981; Boucher & Warrington, 1976) and again by 
Bowler et al. (1997) and led to the coining of the term Task Support 
Hypothesis (TSH) by Bowler et al. (2004). As well as describing the 
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patterning of memory performance across tasks in ASD, the TSH has 
proved to have considerable heuristic value. It has highlighted a parallel 
between the patterning of memory performance seen in typical ageing 
(Craik & Anderson, 1999) and in frontal lobe damage (Schacter, 1987) 
and has helped to account for some apparently contradictory findings 
in the literature. For example, Bennetto et al. (1996) reported 
diminished source memory in adolescents with ASD, whereas Farrant et 
al. (1998) reported no difficulties in a younger, lower-functioning 
group. The first study defined source memory as the number of 
intrusions from an earlier-learned list into the recall of a later list, 
whereas the second defined it in terms of children’s capacity to 
indicate whether they themselves or the experimenter had spoken a 
given word at study.  Bowler et al. (2004) noticed that the first study 
involved an unsupported measure of source, whereas the second 
involved a supported test.  On this basis, they devised two 
experiments in which HFA participants studied lists of words, which 
were either presented in one of four ways, or which the participant had 
to manipulate in one of four ways.  At test, participants were given a 
yes/no recognition test and if they said ‘yes’ to a test word, were 
asked either to select the means of presentation or the kind of action 
from a list on the screen (supported test), or else simply to recall what 
it was (unsupported test).  The results showed no HFA-comparison 
group difference on the supported test, but diminished performance in 
the ASD group on the unsupported test, thus extending to source 
memory the view that memory is particularly difficult for people with 
ASD when unsupported test procedures are used.  A similar role for 
task support on memory for incidentally-encoded context was 
demonstrated by Bowler et al., (2008b).  Participants with and without 
HFA studied a series of words on a screen. Each word was surrounded 
by a red rectangle, outside of which was another word that was either 
strongly or not at all associated with the word inside the frame. 
Participants were told to ignore the words outside the frame.  Later 
testing used either a free recall or a four-option forced-choice 
procedure. In each case, participants were told to try to remember all 
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words they had seen, whether inside or outside the frame. The results 
showed that associative relatedness between studied and incidentally-
encoded words (those inside and outside the frame respectively) 
benefitted both groups’ recognition but enhanced recall only in the 
typical group.  Both these studies show that supported test 
procedures yield better memory than unsupported procedures for 
incidentally-encoded context as well as for incidentally-encoded item-
context relations. 
The TSH paints a picture of memory in ASD as being heavily influenced 
by the here-and-now.  This would suggest less ‘top-down’ processing 
in which stored representations influence how incoming information is 
interpreted. The diminished use of semantic structure to aid recall 
described earlier, together with demonstrations of diminished top-
down processing in visual perception (see Mitchell & Ropar, 2004 for 
review) provide converging evidence that individuals with ASD store 
information in ways that are less likely to influence the processing of 
later, new information. The question now arises of why stored 
information is less effective in modulating the processing of incoming 
information in ASD, thus yielding a behavioural reliance on task 
support. 
 
3.2 Relational Processing Difficulties 
Research on episodic memory in people with ASD strongly supports the 
idea that they experience difficulty in processing relations among 
elements of experience. Understanding this difficulty can be enhanced 
by a more detailed consideration of the parallel problem that they 
sometimes experience in utilising semantic relations among studied 
items in order to enhance their recall.  As we have already seen, failure 
to use meaning to aid recall has long been known to be a characteristic 
of ASD (Bowler et al, 1997; 2000a; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970; 
Smith, Gardiner & Bowler, 2007; Tager-Flusberg, 1991 but see Leekam 
& Lopez, 2003), yet performance on other tasks that rely on semantic 
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processing seems relatively unimpaired. We have already mentioned 
that people with ASD perform as well as typical individuals on 
category-cued recall (Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Mottron et al., 
2001, Tager-Flusberg, 1991; Toichi & Kamio, 2002), suggesting some 
ability to use meaningfulness to aid memory.  One way to account for 
these apparently contradictory findings is to invoke the TSH, since 
semantic relatedness appears to be a problem only when less 
supported test procedures are used.  This argument is further 
supported by Bowler et al.’s (2008b) observation that whereas 
relatedness between studied words and context enhanced recognition 
and recall of studied items for typical individuals, it enhanced only 
recognition for ASD adults of normal IQ.  Thus, we can see that the 
requirement to engage in semantic processing is more likely to 
adversely affect memory in individuals with ASD when unsupported 
task procedures are utilised.  
This account is problematic in that it merely describes and does not 
explain why support is needed for semantic processing. It may simply 
be that the two phenomena are opposite sides of the same coin.  One 
way to go beyond description is to invoke the distinction between 
item-specific processing and relational processing. Item-specific 
processing refers to a tendency to focus on individual items of 
information without reference to relations among them. Item-specific 
processing has been shown to contribute heavily to performance on 
tests of recognition (Anderson & Bower, 1972), on which individuals 
with ASD perform well.  Their pattern of performance on depth-of-
processing tasks (for example, where memory is enhanced if studied 
words have to be rated on deeper, often semantic aspects such as 
asking if it is a fruit rather than shallower features such as number of 
vowels) also suggests that they perform as well as comparison 
participants on deeper processing tasks and better on shallower 
processing tasks (Toichi & Kamio, 2002; 2008).  The pattern of 
performance on the two processing levels suggests that individuals 
with ASD, unlike typical individuals, process words in the two 
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conditions in a similar manner, one, moreover, at which they are highly 
proficient.  It can be argued that this is likely to be an item-specific 
strategy, since it is difficult to see how shallow tasks could be 
accomplished by recourse to a relational strategy.  More direct 
evidence on this question comes from a study by Gaigg, Gardiner & 
Bowler (2008c), who adopted a procedure developed by Hunt and 
Seta (1984) in which participants studied lists of words drawn from a 
number of different categories.  Some categories were represented by 
only 2 exemplars, whereas others had 4, 8, 12 or 16.  Whereas typical 
comparison participants recalled similar proportions of items from small 
as from large categories, adults with ASD recalled far fewer items from 
the smaller categories.  Following Hunt & Seta (1984), Gaigg et al. 
argue that this is because identification of exemplars from smaller 
categories requires alertness to semantic relations among items.  By 
contrast, ability to recall individual exemplars from large (i.e. 
frequently-represented) categories requires alertness to the unique 
features of each item.  Moreover, Gaigg et al. found that whereas 
provision of a relational orienting task (sorting words into categories) 
enhanced the recall of the typical individuals, it did so for the ASD 
group to a lesser extent.  Provision of an item-specific orienting task 
(rating word pleasantness) had similar effects on recall for both 
groups. Gaigg et al.’s findings are consistent with the view that 
whereas typical individuals have both relational and item-specific 
processing at their disposal when performing memory tasks, individuals 
with ASD are dependent to a greater extent on item-specific 
processing alone.  This would explain not only the patterning of 
performance across tasks described at the start of this chapter but 
also the greater reliance on task support seen in ASD. A focus on 
individual items of information diminishes relational semantic 
information available to aid recall, and diminishes the amount of related 
contextual information that can be drawn on to re-create episodic 
recollections and their associated self-involved states of conscious 
awareness. 
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Two caveats are in order concerning the foregoing account.  The first 
is that we should be wary in attributing an absence of relational 
processing in ASD.  It may simply be the case that the balance 
between the two types of processing is different in this population. 
The second, more serious concern, is that there exist tasks that 
appear to involve relational processing (deeper levels-of-processing 
manipulations, susceptibility to associatively-generated memory 
illusions), that are, nevertheless relatively unproblematic for individuals 
with ASD.  To avoid inconvenient, post-hoc attempts to accommodate 
these findings, we need a more principled theoretical account of the 
relational processing difficulties seen in ASD. 
 
A speculative, yet empirically testable way to explain why relational 
processing difficulties are more likely to be seen only on some tasks 
but not on others is through a more detailed analysis of the demands 
that different memory tasks place on participants.  When participants 
engage in free recall of a categorised list, in order for them to become 
aware of the categorical nature of the studied items, they have to 
consider each in relation to other words on the list (e.g. cat with dog 
or apple) and then to relate this comparison to higher-order category 
labels (animal, fruit). Contrast this with the situation in a classic 
memory illusions experiment (e.g. Bowler et al., 2000b) described in an 
earlier section. Here, when participants study associates of a non-
studied word, they are highly likely to remember the non-studied 
associate because it is activated by each of the studied items (e.g., 
bed-sleep, night-sleep, pillow-sleep,…). The operations required of the 
participant in the case of recall of the categorised list involve three-
way processing between pairs of words and their hierarchical 
categories, whereas the illusory memories require only two-way 
processing between a studied item and its associate. On this analysis, 
what seems to pose particular difficulty for individuals with ASD is the 
complexity of the memory task. Task complexity in relation to typical 
children’s development has been explored in detail by Halford (1992) 
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who argues that cognitive development proceeds from a stage where 
individual items are processed in isolation (unary relations) followed by 
the processing of items in a pair-wise fashion (binary relations) and 
finally by the ability to process three-way or ternary relations among 
triplets of items.  
Although the above analysis of memory in ASD is consistent with 
Halford’s (1992) relational complexity account, it needs further 
confirmation by more systematic, hypothesis led investigations. 
Nevertheless, it is corroborated by evidence from other areas of 
psychological functioning in ASD.  Andrews, Halford, Bunch et al. 
(2003) report that the standard ‘Sally-Anne’ false belief task on which 
children with ASD are characteristically delayed (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985) correlates highly with performance on tasks of ternary relational 
processing, and Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi & Fornells-Ambrojo (2005) 
report similar levels of delay in children with ASD on a non-social task 
of complex reasoning and the Sally Anne task. Both tasks are 
consistent with a ternary processing analysis, suggesting that it is the 
processing complexity and not the mental state nature of the Sally-
Anne task that poses particular difficulty for the children with ASD.  
Difficulty in processing three-way relations is also a theme that recurs 
in two of the major theoretical accounts of the development of ASD.  
Early in development, infants who fail to engage in joint attention 
behaviours are almost certainly on an autistic developmental 
trajectory.  Joint attention, which involves children’s co-ordinating 
attention between themselves, an object and another person involves 
what Bakeman and Adamson (1982) refer to as triadic deployment of 
attention.  A similar conceptualisation of the child’s relation between 
self, other and objects of shared attention is put forward by Hobson 
(1993), who argues that the core of autism is a difficulty with the 
patterning of affectively charged interactions with other people. Earlier 
on we saw how difficulties with emotion spill over into the memory 
performance of individuals with ASD.  But Hobson’s characterisation of 
the structure of interpersonal relatedness and its role in the 
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development of symbolic understanding also invokes the child’s 
developing awareness of themselves in relation to another person and 
to objects to which both themselves and that person also stand in 
relation (see Hobson, 1993, pp140-153). In a similar vein, albeit from 
a radically different theoretical perspective, Leslie’s (1987) analysis of 
children’s understanding of pretence and mental state representation 
emphasises the importance of the child’s developing awareness of 
action-centred representations, metarepresentations or M-
representations (Leslie & Roth, 1993, see footnote 1).  This 
development marks an enlargement of the child’s conception of 
objects from one which considers their true identity (e.g. a banana as a 
piece of fruit) to one where they can also be defined in terms of the 
pretend actions of an agent (e.g. Mummy pretends that the banana is 
a telephone).  This last development involves the child’s being able to 
coordinate its own relation to the object with that of another person’s 
relation to it in the context of a playful interpersonal exchange.  Both 
Leslie and Hobson see autism as resulting from a breakdown in their 
respective systems, and the position advocated here is that the two 
systems may be different manifestations of a wider difficulty with 
processing ternary relations, which also has repercussions in the 
domain of memory. 
A final advantage of adopting Halford’s relational complexity account is 
that it elaborates on a position first advocated by Minshew and her 
colleagues (Minshew et al., 2001) who argue that autism is a disorder 
of complex information processing.  This position makes intuitive sense 
when the pattern of performance across memory tasks identified by 
Minshew and colleagues is considered, but runs the risk of circularity 
by defining any task that poses difficulty for people with ASD as being 
‘complex’, without establishing any a priori criteria for what constitutes 
complexity.  Relational complexity allows predictions to be made in 
advance about which tasks should be easy and which difficult for 
individuals with ASD.  In addition, its resonance with other behavioural 
characteristics of ASD suggests that difficulties with ternary relations 
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may be a pervasive cause of a range of psychological atypicalities in 
this population.  
 
4.0 Memory and the Brain 
An important development in the typical memory literature in recent 
years has been an increasing refinement of our understanding of how 
the brain mediates our capacity to remember the past.  In combination 
with our growing knowledge of memory in ASD, this development can 
help to enhance our understanding of functional and structural brain 
atypicalities in that population. The literature on structural brain 
atypicalities in ASD is converging on four broad themes. First, studies 
of brain size indicate that the brains of individuals with ASD are often 
larger than normal and that the developmental trajectory of brain size 
is atypical (Akshoomoff, Pierce & Courchesne, 2002; Aylward, 
Minshew, Field, Sparks & Singh, 2002; Courchesne, Karns, Davis et al, 
2001). Second, neurological abnormalities at the cellular level have 
been reported for the cerebellum, the frontal cortex and certain Medial 
Temporal Lobe (MTL) structures such as the hippocampus and the 
amygdala (see Bachevalier, 2000; Bauman & Kemper, 2005; Casanova, 
Buxhoeveden , Switala & Roy, 2002; DiCicco-Bloom, Lord, 
Zwaigenbaum et al., 2006; Palmen, van Engeland, Hof & Schmitz, 2004 
for relevant reviews). Third, functional imaging studies indicate 
abnormalities in these same regions, particularly MTL structures and 
the frontal lobes (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006). Finally, 
behavioural and neuroscientific evidence is starting to converge on the 
idea that MTL structures and the frontal lobes are characterised by 
abnormalities in their functional connectivity with one another and with 
other areas of the brain (e.g. Gaigg & Bowler, 2007; Bachevalier & 
Loveland, 2006; Just, Cherkassky, Keller et al., 2007; Rippon, Brock, 
Brown & Boucher, 2007).  It is perhaps no coincidence that two of the 
three brain regions that manifest greatest structural abnormalities in 
ASD are also those that are implicated in memory, especially those 
 28 
aspects of memory that appear to operate atypically in this population.  
Although we should be careful about seeing ‘memory’ as residing in 
one or more specific areas of the brain (see Graham, Lee & Barense, 
2008 for discussion), there is now a broad consensus that declarative 
memory is mediated by frontal and MTL structures (see Brown & 
Aggleton, 2001 for review). 
Support for some frontal involvement in memory in ASD is evidenced 
by the greater need of these individuals for task support in memory. 
The need for task support is also a characteristic of memory in 
typically ageing individuals, especially those in whom there is a 
suspicion of frontal lobe dysfunction evidenced by diminished 
performance on executive function tasks (Craik & Anderson, 1999; 
Craik, Morris, Morris & Loewen, 1990).  Similarly, patients with 
acquired frontal lobe damage also show a pattern of performance 
across memory tasks that is not dissimilar to that seen in people with 
ASD (Schacter, 1987). More specifically, such frontal lobe patients 
exhibit difficulties with minimally-cued recall and episodic memory 
tasks whilst their performance on tests of recognition memory is 
undiminished. Together with the literature on executive dysfunction in 
ASD (see Hill, 2004a,b for reviews), this parallel between ASD, 
typically aging and frontal lobe patients provides converging evidence 
for frontal dysfunction as a component of memory difficulty in ASD.  
Although the arguments for frontal contributions to memory in ASD 
are strong, there is increasing evidence pointing to the involvement of 
other brain areas.  In typically-developed individuals, the most severe 
memory disorders result from damage to the medial temporal lobes, 
especially the hippocampus and associated structures of the ento- and 
peri-rhinal cortices and the amygdala (see Mayes & Boucher, 2008 for 
review).  It was this observation that led Boucher and colleagues 
(Boucher, 1981; Boucher & Warrington, 1976) to suggest that autism 
might be a variant of the amnesic syndrome and as such would involve 
medial temporal structures.  In the period since this earlier work, which 
was carried out mostly in children with severe and low-functioning 
 29 
ASD, this view has been less and less advocated (see, for example, 
Bowler et al., 1997). The reason for this change is partly because it is 
evident that individuals with ASD are not amnesic in the same way as 
individuals with severe temporal lobe damage are, but also because our 
conception of ‘autism’ has enlarged to a spectrum view that 
encompasses subtler forms of the condition and includes individuals of 
normal cognitive and language ability and who therefore present 
subtler forms of memory difficulty. Nevertheless, the most recent 
empirical findings are prompting a return to a consideration of medial 
temporal lobe structures as contributing to atypical memory in ASD. 
The capacity to recollect context implies that the disparate elements 
that constitute an episode have to be bound together in memory in a 
way that enables subsequent retrieval.  There is now considerable 
evidence that this relational binding is mediated by the hippocampus 
(Brown & Aggleton, 2001), whilst related medial temporal lobe 
structures such as the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices mediate the 
processing of individual elements. As noted in the previous section, the 
patterning of memory in ASD suggests that such individuals experience 
difficulties in processing relations amongst elements of experiences in 
memory whilst their processing of the individual elements seems 
preserved. Recall, for instance, the observation of diminished 
recognition of episodically-defined combinations of elements in the 
presence of undiminished recognition of the individual elements 
themselves (Bowler et al., under review, a), or of diminished influence 
of item-context relatedness on recall but not on recognition of context 
(Bowler et al., 2008b), or the finding that individuals with ASD 
experience  relatively specific difficulties in drawing on relations 
amongst words to facilitate recall whilst their use of information 
specific to individual words is undiminished (Gaigg et al., 2008c). All of 
these findings, together with the general difficulties in episodic 
memory characterising ASD, strongly suggest compromised 
hippocampal and spared perirhinal and entorhinal functioning in this 
population.  In addition, this framework is compatible with the analysis 
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of complexity by Halford (1992) and thus provides a useful starting 
point for investigating the importance of relational information in other 
cognitive domains such as ‘Theory of Mind’ and logical reasoning. Many 
theorists argue that an important function of the hippocampus is the 
ability to encode objects, events and relations among them rapidly and 
in a way that allows the adaptive use of encoded information in 
different settings (Eichenbaum, 2000). This ability is evidenced by 
tasks such as Transitive Inference (TI) in which an individual can infer 
that A>C having been told that A>B and B>C. TI performance is 
reflected in hippocampal activation (Greene, Gross, Elsinger et al., 
2006), is sensitive to hippocampal damage and seen in people with 
amnesia (Smith & Squire, 2005). On the basis of the arguments 
presented here on diminished relational processing in ASD, we would 
predict diminished TI performance in this population and, moreover, 
would predict that TI performance would correlate both with those 
aspects of semantic organisation of material – clustering and the use 
of categories to aid recall - that pose difficulty for people with ASD, 
and with measures of binding and memory as well as measures of 
episodic remembering. 
In an earlier section, we noted that an important characteristic of 
episodic memory is an awareness of self in time. Although the evidence 
from the domain of memory does not suggest that abnormalities in the 
experience of such temporally extended self-awareness is solely 
responsible for the episodic memory difficulties evident in ASD, 
abnormalities in this domain may nevertheless contribute to it. Given 
the close relation between self-awareness and episodic remembering, it 
is therefore possible, and perhaps even likely, that neural correlates of 
self-awareness are compromised in ASD. There is currently 
considerable debate about the neural correlates of self-awareness (see 
Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi et al., 2005; 
LeDoux, 2003; Morin, 2005) and although some recent studies 
suggest abnormalities in this domain in ASD (Chui, Kayali, Kishida et al., 
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2008) more work is clearly needed before one can draw any 
conclusions.   
Although the patterning of memory functioning in ASD is consistent 
with the idea that it stems from hippocampal dysfunction, albeit with 
some frontal involvement, it does not follow that such atypical 
function results from hippocampal damage per se.  The hippocampus 
receives rich sensory information from a range of cortical and sub-
cortical areas of the brain via the enthorhinal cortex, which in turn 
relays information from the hippocampus back to a host of cortical 
areas (e.g. Squire, 1992). This arrangement is ideal for its function in 
relation to episodic memory and relational processing as it is in a 
position (literally) to integrate information processed in various 
different parts of the cortex and also modulate the processing of 
information in those cortical areas accordingly. It also means, however, 
that the patterning of memory functioning in ASD is not necessarily a 
reflection of hippocampal dysfunction but it could also be the result of 
atypical connectivity between the hippocampus and functionally 
associated areas. Or the information flowing along those pathways 
could be abnormal.  Both the empirical and theoretical literature offer 
some support for these possibilities. As mentioned above, a 
considerable amount of evidence suggests that disparate brain areas 
are abnormally connected in ASD (e.g. Rippon et al., 2007) suggesting 
that the hippocampus may receive inadequate input, or may have 
difficulty in adequately transmitting outputs. The finding that 
emotional arousal atypically modulates forgetting in ASD (Gaigg & 
Bowler, 2008), is particularly relevant in this context, since such 
modulation is widely thought to be mediated by interactions between 
the amygdala and the hippocampus (e.g. Hamann, 2001). It is also 
possible that the information from primary sensory areas that is 
marked for bound representation by the hippocampus is atypical 
because of compromised functioning in those areas.  This account has 
resonances with the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning model of ASD 
advocated by Mottron and colleagues (Mottron, Dawson, Soulières et 
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al., 2006). Their argument is that the processing of information by 
people with ASD is characterised by the retention of lower-level 
perceptual features that remain available even when higher-level, 
conceptual processing has taken place. This has consequences in 
situations where typical individuals process in a predominantly global or 
conceptual manner. In such situations, individuals with ASD have the 
choice to process either perceptually or conceptually, often producing 
atypical performance patterns.  There is some evidence that this 
happens in memory.  Bowler et al. (2008a) found that adults with ASD 
showed less inter-individual convergence of subjective organisation of 
unrelated words than did typical individuals, suggesting that whereas 
the latter group organised words along semantic/associative lines, the 
ASD group may, in addition to this strategy,  have organised the words 
along more perceptual features such as phonology or number of 
syllables. What is needed to confirm this account is a series of 
demonstrations of enhanced perceptual influence on psychological 
processes other than memory. 
The argument just outlined leaves open the possibility that atypical 
hippocampal function may be the result of structural or functional 
problems elsewhere in the brain, which modify information fed to the 
hippocampus.  But it ignores one fundamental aspect of ASD, namely 
that they are a set of developmental disorders, that is to say that they 
affect the trajectory of development of the individual in a way that 
yields an atypical endpoint.  We can reasonably expect this atypical 
developmental trajectory to be as evident in brain structures as in 
adaptive behaviour.  So, for example, it may be the case that enhanced 
perceptual functioning may feed information to the hippocampus in a 
manner that influences the bindings it makes, and that these different 
bindings in turn affect the way in which the hippocampus develops and 
influences processing in other brain areas.  There is some evidence 
from the neuroimaging literature that is consistent with this position. 
Schumann, Hamstra, Goodlin-Jones et al. (2004) report atypical 
development of the hippocampus in children and adolescents across 
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the autism spectrum.  They also report atypicalities in the 
development of the amygdala in these groups.  As we have seen, the 
amygdala plays an important role in emotional memory. In view of the 
connectivity between the hippocampus and the amygdala (Smith, 
Stephan, Rugg et al., 2006), it can be argued that diminished 
emotional modulation of memory in ASD is a specific aspect of more 
general difficulties with binding in memory. 
 
5.0  Conclusions 
It is now well established that ASD is characterised by a particular 
pattern of spared and impaired performance across different memory 
tasks. This pattern points to difficulties in the processing of 
information in ways that require binding of those elements of 
experience that uniquely define episodes, in the flexible relations 
among features that can be organised hierarchically, and in the 
emotional modulation of memory. Processing of individual items by 
contrast is relatively spared. All these types of processing implicate 
different structures of the medial temporal lobe of the brain, most 
particularly the hippocampus, the amygdala and the entorhinal and 
perirhinal cortices, as well as modulation of the functioning of these 
areas by the frontal lobes.  Although these implications have yet to be 
systematically tested, they are consistent with the current state of 
knowledge of the development of these structures in the autistic brain.  
What also needs to be established is the extent to which atypical 
developmental trajectories in these structures are the result of 
abnormal input that results from atypical processing in other brain 
areas or to some initial damage to the structures themselves. As well 
as providing a framework within which to test neural underpinnings of 
psychological underpinnings in ASD, the behavioural findings in memory 
also provide a window into the inner experience of these individuals by 
showing that they have diminished self-involvement in their memories 
for past experience and that the quality of these experiences, the 
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connections that the individual makes between experiences and the 
here-and-now consequences of a particular memory can at times be 
radically different from those of a typical individual. 
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